SECRET AFFAIRS
Britain’s Collusion with Radical IslamBy Mark Curtis Published by Serpent’s Tail |
 |
Secret Affairs: Britain’s Collusion with Radical Islam is a daunting and detailed account of British perfidy in the Islamic world. This almost appears to have increased as its status as an imperial power became more and more problematic.
The book leaves little doubt that the “Terror” in the War on Terror has been greatly facilitated by British practice over many decades, although kept away from British shores by discreet agreements until recently.
At the same time, it presents a clear sighted view of the realities of power and offers some implicit warnings for Britain’s successor, the United States. “Blowback” – the unintended consequences of the poorly managed activities of secret services – now seems so widespread that it can invite the judgement that secret services have been allowed to go feral, free of considered discipline or clearly defined purpose.
Moreover, the fact that Pakistan has been an intimate student of British ways is apparent. American complaints make it clear that their ally in Afghanistan is pursuing an independent agenda, often expressed through covert action, which all too rarely corresponds closely with that of its major partner.
Curtis makes it clear that no part of the Islamic world was sheltered from Britain’s free-wheeling covert activity, which, as the following passage explains, recognised few or no constraints:
“In both Iran and Egypt, Britain was prepared to secretly connive with Islamist forces, using them as part of its arsenal of weapons in covert action… The resort to collaborating with forces, however anti-British or however much of an anathema to long-term interests, would recur in latter decades, even when avowedly jihadist terrorist groups came into the picture.”
A chapter entitled The Saudi and Iranian Revolutions makes clear succinctly both the character of expediency in British policy and the implicit acceptance of weakness in their negotiating position:
“In short, the British knew exactly with whom they were dealing as the Saudis promoted any cause inside the Kingdom or overseas in the name of Wahhabi extremism and defence of the House of Saud.”
Indeed, the picture of a Saudi Arabia capable of dictating terms to both the UK and US is a memorable feature of the book. It highlights the way in which “progress” has created a dependency on energy supplies that over-rides almost all other considerations.
The British and Americans owe much of their influence over more than the past half century to being leaders in recognising this and moving early to gain monopolistic controls. Britain’s covert efforts to mitigate the dissipation of this advantage provide much of the substance of the book.
In the process, however, the story illuminates how America became more and more the dominant player and how Islam for long served as an invaluable foil in the region against nationalist movements that might compromise Anglo-American corporate interests.
Curtis also illustrates broader aspects of the strategies used to preserve the status quo in the face of stirring aspirations in the developing world:
“Dozens of developing countries were subject to this economic interventionism, usually under the formal auspices of structural adjustment programs managed by the (essentially US controlled) World Bank and International Monetary Fund. The primary beneficiaries were Western corporations seeking access to new markets, while levels of poverty and inequality shot up in many countries.”
Secret Affairs belongs to a genre of books dedicated to re-evaluating the policies, strategies and success of Anglo-American elites over the past century or more. Such books appear to be growing in number as the warnings mount about the end of a period of two hundred years of Anglo-American global order. One is tempted to say that they might be described as the undertaking of an examination (or autopsy) on the slightly breathing but close to the end body of a once all-conquering warrior. Were there any likelihood of recovery, more respect would need to be paid to memories of better days.
Secret Affairs also makes it very clear that such warriors do not die easily or quickly. One reason for this, which applies to both the UK and US, is illustrated by the passage above explaining the use of the World Bank and IMF. Global structures in relation to privileged access to energy supplies and also in relation to privileged use of international organisations have made major contributions to British and American wealth. It would be close to suicidal to surrender easily these privileges, particularly when the British and American economies are increasingly described as bankrupt.
Yet, as Secret Affairs makes clear, the skills, daring and imagination that once made Britain great are now proving counter-productive. Nations like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, which hardly command any attention in the average native English speaker’s consciousness, have assumed positions where past indulgence and indifference is replaced by the awkward realisation of a strategic dependence. This allows little room for manoeuvre. In this context, past assumptions suddenly betray those who rely on them.
In a most important sense, Curtis issues a strong wakeup call by simply detailing a wide range of British covert actions and doing no more than hinting at their future consequences. The fact that these consequences were not considered relevant when decisions were made in the past will not diminish their importance in shaping events in the 21st century.
At a time when the Anglo-American powers seem to be finding it harder than ever to take effective action to bolster declining fortunes, it should engender a much more reflective approach to critical decisions. This might apply both to those at the head of government and to those operating covertly in the field, far from immediate or effective oversight.
– Reviewed by Reg Little in New Dawn 130
